Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus Should Join NATO
19- ISTVÁN GYARMATI
- 31.05.2024, 22:45
- 9,604
NATO is the only organization that can protect against the Russian threat.
Charter97.org continues the series of articles from the book “Belarus in NATO”, published by the European Belarus Foundation. This article was written by Ambassador István Gyarmati, the former Hungarian Deputy Defence Minister, President of the International Centre for Development and Democratic Transition and Secretary General of the Hungarian Atlantic Council.
Belarus in NATO? What a stupid idea! That’s how most would react to such a proposal. But “stupid ideas” might turn out no less than the vision that might happen and might happen sooner than most could imagine. Let me elaborate briefly on why I think this is not a “stupid idea”, but even more than a vision: an unavoidable necessity.
There are big differences in how people – even experts – see the current security situation in Europe. This is not surprising: what we see today is an immensely complicated situation that resembles the Cold War, but in many respects it is different. The origins are different, the main players are different compared to what they were in the second half of the Twentieth century, the solutions – if any – are different and the perspectives are different, too.
Belarus’ NATO membership must be looked at from two perspectives. First: is it what the Belarus people want? Second: what is the strategic context within which such an analysis makes sense?
Let’s start with the first. It is very clear – and the last elections, especially its aftermath showed it unambiguously – that the Belarus people want democracy, freedom and a normal life.
Just like other people in Europe (and worldwide). They see a shining example in Central and Eastern Europe, where former Soviet colonies became normal democracies.
And, surprise surprise – they are all (current or upcoming) members of NATO (and the European Union). That alone is a strong argument in their (and our) eyes to join these countries as democratic, free, independent states (by implication also members of NATO and the European Union). But that is not the whole picture. There is no doubt that the people of Belarus want democracy and independence. But I don’t want to suggest that they all see and accept that in the geostrategic situation of Belarus – and drawing the consequences from the Russian aggression against Ukraine – they understand that NATO membership is the only way to unquestionably secure the country’s independence thus also make sure there is no interference from outside (Russia) to undermine democracy.
Why? It is easily understandable if we look at history and the current situation. First, the people of Belarus were socialized in a Soviet-type regime. A dictatorship that constantly suggested to them that this form of Government is the best and, by implication, the only way to guarantee stability in and security of the country is through cooperation with Russia.
This argument cannot be easily dismissed. For sure, good neighbourly relations with a much stronger power can be very beneficial. Provided this neighbour is democratic, has no aspirations to interfere with the internal affairs of the country concerned, does not have the tendency and the desire to dominate others, especially its neighbours and, ultimately, does not want to annex them, one way or the other.
That all sounds – and can be – good, but Russia is not such a country. Russian history is the history of Russian expansionism – be it in the good old form of conquering territories or under the disguise of “internationalism”. Current-day Russia is no exception: on the contrary: Putin’s Russia is more aggressive than most of its predecessors – including even the post-Stalinist Soviet Union.
For Putin, Ukraine is only the first step.
His goal is – not the restoration of the Soviet Union. He goes far beyond that. His vision is the Russian world (“русский мир”). What does it mean? In short – and admittedly little simplified – it means that wherever Russians live - it’s lawfully Russian territory.
Even more: wherever Russians have ever lived – it is lawfully Russian territory. This is not a new concept: remember, what was the title of the Tsar? He/she was the „Tsar of all Russians”. Not “of Russia”, but of “all Russians”. i.e. wherever Russians live the Tsar is their ruler. And with it comes, of course, the territory, where they live.
Ilyin and Dugin – the ideologists of Putin’s court – have made it very clear. So did Putin himself – admittedly, not very recently, as in the current situation it would sound just a little ridiculous, but many times in the course of the past years. And he never gave it up. Ukraine is only the first step – he and his lieutenants said it frequently and very clearly The „draft treaty” presented in December 2021 clearly reflected that the next step would be to restore Russian domination over Central and Eastern Europe thus de facto killing NATO. This clearly shows that his next goal would be to conquer those countries after they would lose the NATO umbrella.
So, the Belarus people need democracy to understand what it takes to be safe and secure with the Russian neighbor. This will be part of the education people always and everywhere need after the transition from dictatorship to democracy (one of the mistakes we, in several Central and Eastern European new democracies made was that we did not explain what democracy really means, what it takes to promote democracy in our own country and how security is an important part of democracy).
That being said, it will be a difficult, but not impossible task. It must be part of Belarus’ preparation for NATO. I don’t want to go into details of what it takes to become eligible and prepared for NATO membership. The above-mentioned task will be one of them. Already here I want to state: we must not envisage a decade-long process. Democracy must be stabilzed quickly. And together with that, the country’s security must be secured. I would suggest that after the establishment of democracy in Belarus, several years should pass, no more.
Just one word about the present. I am convinced those who want (democratic) change in Belarus should already now start to explain what it takes for Belarus to become safe and secure. It must start to enlighten people about the dangers Russia is posing to the country. And when the question arises, of how to deal with that danger, the NATO option becomes obvious.
One of the biggest challenges (is) and will be how to deal with Russian propaganda. Have no doubt, even after democracy is established in Belarus, Russia will not stop its subversive propaganda. On the contrary: it will become stronger and even more aggressive. And they will find allies and supporters within the newly democratic Belarus, too. It is a big challenge – for the democratic countries in Europe at present, as well - how to resist Russian propaganda. It will be a daunting task for Belarus, too.
Let’s move to the second issue, the strategic context.
NATO enlargement has been a controversial issue all the time. Part of the controversies was Russian opposition, which – while grossly exaggerated, can be seen as understandable, though not acceptable. Part of it, which has been even more difficult to understand and overcome, was (is) opposition from within: quite a few politicians, and even more experts, thus also part of the public opinion have opposed NATO enlargement all the time. We do not want to go into the reasons for it, just concentrate on one “reason”: Russia’s legitimate security interests must be taken into account and satisfied.
In itself, this is a legitimate and acceptable reasoning. There is, however, one little problem: what is legitimate?
Those mentioned above suggested, it is Russia and Russia alone that can define what legitimate security interests are. Even in the case of a democratic country, it is not entirely true: security is a complicated issue. One country’s security affects the security of others. The closer the other country is, the more. Consequently, neighbours are, as a rule, more affected. Today, in the era of globalization – and warfare is being globalized, too this is less significant, but still basically true. Accordingly, only those security interests can be recognized as legitimate that take into account and honour the security interests of others, especially those of neighbours.
The issue is even more complicated if the country in question is not a democracy. In the case of Russia, nobody in her/his right mind has ever claimed that Russia was a democracy – with the exception of Putin, but that does not deserve serious consideration (sure, Kerensky and Yeltsin could be seen as intending to create democracy, but they failed). Accordingly, what the leadership of those countries, in our case Russia, does not necessarily reflect the real interests of the people, of the country, and this is increasingly true, when it comes to security. And when we speak of Russia, whose history has been the history of expansion, who never hesitated to use force to underline and implement its expansionist policy, it must be clear: that the security interest as defined by the Russian leadership, could not be seen as “legitimate”.
What are then the legitimate security interests of Russia? It is an extremely complicated issue as it is very difficult to find a credible source of it. Is it the Russian internal opposition? Not really, as they are many times also under the influence of some Russian ideology (see Solzhenitsyn or even Navalny).
Or are the foreign politicians and/or experts? It is, in principle, incorrect to suggest that foreigners are the holders of truth in relation to a country. But in practice, it is even more difficult as experts widely differ when they try to define what Russia’s security interests are.
The conclusion is that -as it has been in the past – it will be also in the future to find a credible definition of Russian security interests that would be universally or even majority acceptable – even if it does not include the Russian leadership. A pragmatic solution – or rather modus vivendi – could be to try to agree on what is NOT legitimate, thus not acceptable security interests of Russia. In such an effort even most of the Russia-appeasers could agree. And ultimately: every country, and also NATO and the European Union will offer a definition that will serve as theirs and will serve as the basis of their strategy towards Russia.
Let’s look at what cannot be accepted as legitimate security interests of Russia – all of them have been declared as legitimate by Putin.
The right to influence, or even determine the type and composition of the Government of another country. Yes, I know: what about the United States and other democratic countries' interference by “democracy building”? Again, this deserves and other, or more, similar essays, let it limit to saying that it is different, if somebody wants to support the efforts of the people to get rid of dictatorship and create some kind of democracy and the opposite: to support or create internal forces to establish a dictatorship. Yes, in some cases, the United States and others have done similar things, too, it might be seen as a mistake, but for sure, does not give the right to do it again and again. And one more difference: the last time the United States conquered and annexed territory, happened in the 19th century, while Russia is in the process of just doing it and has done it all the time.
And one more remark: we, who cherish the values of democracy, the rule of law and human rights should not feel ashamed to admit: yes, we think sometimes it is legitimate, moreover: our obligation “to interfere” with the internal affairs of another country. In some cases, it is legitimate and under international rules in the case of “humanitarian intervention”1 or the case of “gross violations of human rights”2.
But it is time to be bold and go further: in some cases, exceptionally, we should do it, even if it is not necessarily in accordance with international rules: democracy promotion – if it is done as an exception and if it is done right – if different from imperialist dictatorships invading other countries. Let’s have the courage to say: two similar things are not always similar. Our principles are superior to those of dictators as they serve the common good of the people - accordingly, they can justify certain steps that are not necessarily legal – but the right thing to do.
Let’s come back to NATO. The most frequently used argument against NATO expansion is that it would provoke Russia and would trigger Russian reaction that would lead to large-scale conflict, World War III, etc. Before arguing, let’s have a look, why has NATO been enlarged in the past decades? And the answer is: for the same reason why it was established in 1949. The Russian threat and the fear of a Russian invasion. Now, if it was legitimate to “provoke the Russians” in 1949, and it was legitimate “to risk a large-scale conflict” in 1949 for the reason that countries and peoples were afraid of Russian expansion, why is it not legitimate to do it now?
The reason for the creation and the expansion of NATO is the same: Russian expansionism and aggressiveness, and frequently direct threat to other countries.
The reaction to it should not be to suggest – or demand – to take Russia’s” legitimate security interests “ into account, accept them and base our policy on that assumption, but to make it impossible for Russia to realize those “legitimate interests” as they are NOT LEGITIMATE. Strange as it might sound it is also in the interest of Russia, the Russian people to contain Russian expansionism.
First, it saves them from a devastating war that would destroy much of their country and kill millions of Russians. I don’t think it would be a real consolation to those people that millions of others will be killed, too. I also believe that if and when the centuries-long Russian imperialistic policy comes to an end, Russia’s internal situation will also slowly change for the better. Nationalism and incitement to war will give place to real problems: democracy, good neighborly relations, cooperation. The money wasted for preparations for war will be spent for the good of the people. It is my strong conviction that democracy will not be able to progress in Russia as long as this imperialistic warmongering remains in the center of Russian policy.
While we hardly can influence the internal situation in Russia (but try to help emerging forces of democracy), we might be very well able to create the external circumstances that will slowly undermine and weaken this Russian foreign policy thus slowly opening the way for a more realistic and cooperative one thus also weakening the internal dictatorship of Russia.
In addition to the strategic reasons that Russia's expansionism, revisionism and aggressiveness, thus the Russian threat must be opposed for the sake of our own security, it is clear to me that it is also in the interest of the Russian people.
NATO is the only structure that can effectively withstand the Russian threat. If we want to make NATO more capable, we need to do everything possible to make it happen. New members make NATO stronger. New members bordering Russia even more so. Accordingly, we must finish building real European security by accepting the remaining three states, Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus in NATO.
Yes, the conditions are not yet ripe to do it immediately. Not because of the war in Ukraine as the Vilnius decisions not to accept Ukraine in NATO are counterproductive, since they give Russia the right of veto – which never happened before and it is ridiculous that this happened when Russia is weaker than ever before -, but also for other reasons, both internal in the three countries and also external ones. But we must be clear: NATO must expand to fill the still-existing gaps. It will not only strengthen the Alliance, thus the security of its members (including the new ones), but also help Russians reform their own country, make progress towards democracy.
Notice:
1. To the "right" of humanitarian intervention was, in the post Cold-War context, for the first time invoked in 1990 by the UK delegation after Russia and China had failed to support a no-fly zone over Iraq.
2. As the OSCE defined it.
Reference:
Amb. Prof.Dr. István Gyarmati is President of the International Centre for Development and Democratic Transition and Secretary General of the Hungarian Atlantic Council. He was chairman of the UN Secretary General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, member of the Board of the International Institute of Strategic Studies and the NATO Defense College Foundation, etc. He has a distinguished career in the Hungarian diplomatic service as Head of the Hungarian Delegation to the OSCE, Chair of the Task Force of The Hungarian OSCE Presidency, Director General for Security Policy, etc. He also served as Head of OSCE Missions to Georgia and Chechnya, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Senior Vice President of the EastWest Institute, Head of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Monitoring Mission in Moldova.
Amb. Gyarmati holds an MBA, a doctorate in Political Science and a Ph.D. of Strategic Studies. He is a titular professor at Milton Friedman University and Atanaz University. He is the author of numerous publications on security and defence policy, European security, conflict management and Hungarian defence policy.