29 January 2025, Wednesday, 5:59
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Ukraine Struck At Vulnerable Spot Of Putin's Regime

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Ukraine Struck At Vulnerable Spot Of Putin's Regime

There is an important factor that is not often talked about.

The Kursk operation began on August 6, 2024. At that time, there were about 11 thousand Russian troops in the Kursk region, mostly conscripts. The peak value of the Ukrainian Defense Forces control zone in the Kursk region during the operation was 1,300 km².

Currently, about 60 thousand Russian troops are concentrated in the Kursk region, while losses in less than 6 months amounted to 38 thousand people killed, wounded and captured.

Thus, the total concentration of Russian forces in total amounted to almost 100 thousand in almost half a year, or an increase from the initial grouping of almost 90 thousand.

In fact, in the Kursk region, a number comparable to a combined arms army and a couple of divisions was concentrated and used.

In turn, the effect of such a concentration of forces and resources was only a partial, not a complete return of the Kursk region under the control of the Russian authorities, and today the Ukrainian Defense Forces fully or partially (gray zone) controls about 630 km². In other words, during the entire period of the Kursk operation, Russian troops were able to regain control of 670 km², having lost 38 thousand personnel, in a proportion of 57 people per 1 km².

An important aspect is the tying down of Russian forces, comparable to a regional military administration and several motorized rifle divisions, on the territory of Russia itself and forcing them to systematically spend forces and resources in combat clashes in the Kursk region, while these 90 thousand over these six months could have ended up either near Kupyansk, or Pokrovsk, or even in the Orikhove direction.

But these are all military factors and the effect they had within the framework of the Kursk operation, which negatively affected the combat capability of the Russian occupying forces and the reputation of the Putin regime, which is forced to fight in the third year of the war on its own territory. There is another factor that is not often talked about — humanitarian.

About 150 thousand people have fled from the fighting in the Kursk region. About 30 thousand are placed in temporary accommodation centers, which are being turned into permanent accommodation centers. The rest of the refugees either settled on their own or live with relatives, etc.

At the same time, the Putin regime is unable to cope with this humanitarian challenge. People do not receive payments, even a completely beggarly 10-15 thousand rubles, untimely humanitarian aid, lack of employment, and so on. The Kursk region authorities, represented by acting governor Alexander Khinshtein, have turned into a walking meme and a symbol of the helplessness and indifference of the country's leadership.

In the sixth month of the Kursk operation, the humanitarian crisis is forcing Russians to do what they would never dare to do in any other situation — to go to rallies and demand something from the authorities, sometimes in raised tones.

And we are talking about only a small part of the Kursk region, and not about entire regions, with district centers and large industrial cities destroyed to ashes, as in Ukraine.

And if the scale of the Kursk operation was really somewhat different? Or the Ukrainian Defense Forces had more such control zones, not only in the Kursk region? What if another such zone could appear in a certain future and another 150 or 200, 250 thousand Russian refugees would appear?

The Kursk operation clearly demonstrated Russia's helplessness in ensuring the security of its borders.

The Kursk operation clearly demonstrated Russia's inability to effectively fight even on its own territory and quickly return territories occupied by the enemy under its control, even with a numerical advantage.

The Kursk operation clearly demonstrated Russia's inability to cope with unexpected humanitarian challenges that create the effect of initial chaos and public, social discontent, something that Putin's Russia has always feared most of all.

The Kursk operation had and continues to have a serious effect and influence both on Russian troops and on internal processes in Russia. And therefore, there is only one conclusion to be drawn from this — we must repeat it!

Oleksandr Kovalenko, Telegram

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